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INTRODUCTION
The use of DNA evidence within the criminal justice system has
become a part of popular culture. The growth of the “CSI” franchise
on major network television,1 coupled with its success in attaining
viewers,2 may suggest a public fascination with the use of scientific
∗

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
As of February 2007, CBS aired three separate television shows based on the
CSI franchise: CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, CSI: Miami, and CSI: NY. See CSI
Homepage, http://www.cbs.com/primetime/csi/ (last visited April 22, 2008); CSI:
Miami Homepage, http://www.cbs.com/primetime/csi_miami/ (last visited April 22,
2008); CSI: NY Homepage, http://www.cbs.com/primetime/csi_ny/ (last visited
April 22, 2008).
2
According to Neilsen Media Research, CSI: Crime Scene Investigation was
the most watched show on U.S. television for the 2002-03 television season. Joal
Ryan, TV Season Wraps; “CSI” Rules, EONLINE, May 22, 2003,
http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=2c7a48e7-bd06-4a73-93110bab5caf4ef1&page=2 (last visited April 22, 2008). CSI maintained its dominance
throughout the decade, ranking 2nd in viewership for 2003-04, 3rd in 2005-06, and
4th in 2006-07, while its sister show, CSI: Miami, placed 9th in 2003-04, 7th in
2004-05, and 9th in 2005-06. See Joal Ryan, “Idol” Rules TV Season, EONLINE,
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techniques to solve crimes.3 The popularity of the show (and its
imitators) is a small example of the way in which DNA testing has
revolutionized the criminal justice system. Yet for all its advantages,
access to DNA evidence—and the increasingly accurate results
derived from improved testing4—is subject to a procedural roadblock
in some jurisdictions that limits access to those who may benefit from
its use. Specifically, the procedural roadblock erected in some
jurisdictions prevents prisoners from gaining post-conviction access to
physical evidence for the purpose of DNA testing through a § 1983
claim. Instead, those jurisdictions limit prisoners to the more
complicated—and potentially more restrictive and time-consuming—
habeas corpus relief.
There are two judicial methods by which a prisoner may gain
access to physical evidence in order to conduct DNA testing. First, the
universally accepted method is through a writ of habeas corpus, by

May 27, 2004, http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=f11a7579-284c4d9b-bc69-3bfd2b9bec42&page=2 (2003-04 Nielsen ratings) (last visited April 22,
2008); Joal Ryan, No Toppling “Idol”, EONLINE, June 1, 2005,
http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=9c3320c5-f831-4443-9776a2061f3b9ddd&page=2 (2004-05 Nielsen ratings) (last visited April 22, 2008); Joal
Ryan, “Idol” Extends Reign, EONLINE, May 25, 2006,
http://www.eonline.com/news/article/index.jsp?uuid=8ccaf68b-821c-4eec-91cb1f269b21391c (2005-06 ratings) (last visited April 22, 2008); Joal Ryan, Idol
Biggest of Smallest, EONLINE, May 25, 2007, http://www.eonline.com/news/article/
index.jsp?uuid=17b8f65c-3700-49b5-8432-b0ac725ccf21&page=2 (2006-07 Nielsen
ratings) (last visited April 22, 2008).
3
The phenomenon does not appear limited to the U.S. As of December 2006,
the CSI franchise was “syndicated in 200 countries to a global audience of 2 billion.”
Gerard Gilbert, CSI: The cop show that conquered the world, THE INDEPENDENT,
Dec. 19, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/csi-the-cop-show-thatconquered-the-world-429262.html (last visited April 22, 2008). It has been
anecdotally suggested that American juries now expect a higher standard of forensic
evidence due in part to the show’s popularity. Id.
4
DNA testing in the early 1990s, which used the PCR method, could isolate a
genetic marker that would be shared by only 2 percent of the population, or one in
fifty. The chance of two people matching genetic markers in current STR testing are
less than one in a trillion. Fay Flam, Initial DNA Scientist Vindicated, but still has
concerns, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, A-14, Jan. 13, 2006.
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which a prisoner may challenge the validity of his confinement.5 The
second, more controversial method is through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Created by the Civil Rights Act, this cause of action allows any person
to file a civil claim in federal court if their constitutional rights have
been violated by a state actor under color of state law.6 While both
methods can yield the access to post-conviction DNA testing that the
prisoner seeks, habeas corpus relief is subject to several rules—such as
the “state exhaustion” requirement—which can make it a less
desirable route to relief than § 1983. Federal appellate courts are split
on the validity of these methods. While the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have held that a claim requesting post-conviction access to
DNA evidence is cognizable under both habeas corpus proceedings
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,7 the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have
limited the relief to such requests strictly to a writ of habeas corpus.8
In Savory v. Lyons, the Seventh Circuit faced the question of
whether a prisoner could validly make a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for post-conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of
DNA testing.9 In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit declined to join the
Fourth Circuit’s approach, instead following the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits in holding that such a claim under § 1983 was viable.10 In
reaching its decision, the Savory court drew support from the 2005
Supreme Court case Wilkinson v. Dotson, a case which updated the
Court’s treatment of the tension between § 1983 and habeas claims for
post-conviction relief without expressly speaking to the issue of DNA
testing. By recognizing that Dotson’s reasoning all but expressly
resolved the dispute over the viability of state prisoner’s § 1983 claims
5

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
Id. at 483-84.
7
See Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District, 423
F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-92 (11th
Cir. 2002).
8
See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery
County, 303 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2002); Boyle v. Mayer, 46 Fed.Appx. 340, 340
(6th Cir. 2002).
9
Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).
10
Id. at 672.
6
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for post-conviction access to DNA testing, the Savory court reached
the proper result and ensured that future decisions in the Seventh
Circuit will be decided on their merits, rather than be derailed by
procedural roadblocks.11
This comment examines the ramifications of the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in Savory concerning whether § 1983 may act as a vehicle to
obtain post-conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of
DNA testing. Part I provides a brief introduction to the writ of habeas
corpus and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including the relative merits of each in
terms of post-conviction access. Part II examines the judicial stage set
for Savory, including Supreme Court precedents and the conflicting
interpretations developed by the Circuits. Part III discusses the facts,
holding, and reasoning of Savory. Finally, Part IV examines Savory
within the context of the circuit split and the Dotson decision, and
argues that the Seventh Circuit reached the proper result by holding
that state prisoners’ § 1983 claims seeking post-conviction access to
DNA testing are cognizable.12

11

It has been argued that this “overproceduralism” makes it difficult for
inmates to have their constitutional claims heard. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring PostConviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners:
Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315,
315-16 (1998).
12
It is critical to note that while the plaintiff in Savory brought a § 1983 claim
asserting a constitutional right of due process to post-conviction access to physical
evidence for the purpose of DNA testing, Savory does not answer the question of
whether such a right exists. 469 F.3d at 675. Indeed, because the statute of
limitations for a § 1983 claim had elapsed in Savory, the court was not forced to
answer such a question. Id. Instead, Savory deals with the procedural question of
whether § 1983 is an appropriate vehicle to make such a challenge. Judge King’s
dissent in Harvey takes special effort to note that though he believes § 1983 is a
proper vehicle for such a claim, the US Constitution does not support a due process
right to post-conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of DNA testing
under the facts of that case. 278 F.3d at 388 (King, J., dissenting).
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I. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In examining whether prisoners should be able to use a § 1983
action to gain post-conviction access to physical evidence, or instead
be limited to habeas corpus relief, it is necessary to address a threshold
question: why does it matter which approach the prisoner uses? If a
prisoner is guaranteed to have his habeas claim heard, why bother
filing a § 1983 claim of questionable validity? The answer lies in the
procedural elements specific to each approach, which yield concrete
differences in how the prisoner’s desired result is reached. It is these
procedural differences that make § 1983 claims more desirable to a
prisoner than a habeas claim, thereby making the cognizability of the
§ 1983 claim for post-conviction access to DNA testing of importance.
A. Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus provides a vehicle by which a prisoner
can challenge the validity of his imprisonment.13 Thus, if a state
prisoner is held in violation of his federal constitutional rights, he may
apply for a writ of habeas corpus for relief.14 Inspired by the Magna
Carta and imported from English law,15 the writ of habeas corpus is
often referred to as the “Great Writ” due to its central role in
preserving basic notions of due process and “personal liberty.”16 The
Supreme Court once wrote:
[a]though in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of
procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with
13

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
See Steiker, supra n.11, at 325 (writing that “federal habeas remains
available for the redress of virtually all federal constitutional violations”).
15
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) (discussing the introduction of a
bill before the English House of Commons in 1593 to implement the use of the writ
of habeas corpus to combat perceived violations of due process guaranteed by the
Magna Carta). While Fay is no longer good law, its historical discussion of the writ
of habeas corpus remains relevant.
16
Id. at 401.
14

561
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

5

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.
For its function has been to provide a prompt and
efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be
intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a
civilized society, government must always be
accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment:
if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with
the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is
entitled to his immediate release.17
Indeed, the writ is so vital to American ideals that the Founding
Fathers felt compelled to guarantee its maintenance in the
Constitution’s Suspension Clause.18
The federal habeas corpus statute states that a federal court may
only consider a state prisoner’s writ of habeas corpus application if the
grounds for that application are that his imprisonment violates federal
law.19 Furthermore, a federal court will not grant a writ of habeas
corpus if the state prisoner has failed to exercise all available state
remedies.20 Known as the “state exhaustion” requirement, this means
17

Id. at 401-402.
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion or the public Safety may require it.” U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
19
The statute reads:
18

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
20
The statute states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State; or there is an
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that if the state prisoner has any unused “right” or “procedure”
available under state law to address the issue presented in his
application for a writ of habeas corpus, the federal court will not grant
the writ.21
Federalism concerns underlie the imposition of this “state
exhaustion” requirement. Specifically, courts have expressed concern
that allowing a federal court to correct errors of federal law made by
state courts, without first giving the state court system opportunity to
correct the error itself, would generate friction between the two
systems.22 The “state exhaustion” requirement is an expression of the
doctrine of “comity”23—it does not eliminate the federal habeas
corpus remedy, but rather defers its exercise until all available state
remedies have been exercised.24
absence of available State corrective process; or circumstances
exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant.
28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1) (2000).
21
“An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28
U.S.C. 2254(c) (2000).
22
See Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973); see also Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (explaining that “it would be unseemly in our
dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional
violation”).
23
“[T]he doctrine of comity between courts . . . teaches that one court should
defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another
sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had
an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Darr, 339 U.S. at 204.
24
The Supreme Court wrote in Cook v. Hart:
[C]omity demands that the state courts, under whose process [the
prisoner] is held, and which are, equally with federal courts,
charged with the duty of protecting the accused in the enjoyment
of his constitutional rights, should be appealed to in the first
instance. Should such rights be denied, his remedy in the federal
court will remain unimpaired.
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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 as a method to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.25 It creates a
civil cause of action by which any person may challenge state action
that violates their federal constitutional or statutory rights in federal
court.26 The Supreme Court has compared § 1983 to a common law
tort action,27 established on “the principle that a person should be
compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal
rights.”28 An action brought under § 1983 may seek declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief.29
Like an application for writ of habeas corpus, a successful § 1983
claim requires a violation of federal law.30 In the context of obtaining
post-conviction access to DNA testing, state prisoners often allege that
denial of access to DNA testing constitutes a violation of due process

146 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1892).
25
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company, Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982).
26
The statute states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute. . . of any
State. . . subjects. . . any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
27
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994); see also Student Note,
Benjamin Vetter, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction Access to DNA
Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 593-94 (2004).
28
Heck, 512 U.S. at 483 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58
(1978)); see also Vetter, supra n.27, at 595.
29
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See also Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle:
Continued Frustrating Conflict Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus
Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 89 (1988).
30
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (protecting “immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws”).

564
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/5

8

Newton: Sweet Result in Savory: How the Seventh Circuit Took the Correct

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

under Brady v. Maryland.31 In Brady, a man convicted of murder in a
Maryland state court argued that the prosecution had suppressed
exculpatory statements of a witness in violation of due process.32 The
Court agreed with the prisoner, holding that “suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment.”33 The Court reasoned that such disclosure by the
prosecution is necessary for a fair trial, which is a fundamental
concept of our judicial system.34 Subsequent to Brady, courts have
argued that if this fairness principle requires disclosure of exculpatory
evidence before trial, there is no reason it should not likewise extend
to disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence (such as DNA
evidence) after the trial.35 Therefore, when a state officer refuses a
prisoner post-conviction access to DNA testing, a prisoner raising a
§ 1983 claim would argue that the state officer denying access to the
evidence had deprived him of his constitutional right to due process
under color of state law.
Section 1983 actions are not subject to the “state exhaustion”
requirement because the statute was enacted to circumvent the legal
systems of states that were unwilling to enforce their own laws.36
Specifically, the enacting Congress felt that states’ refusal to address
31

See Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 674-75 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Bradley
v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2002); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 378
(4th Cir. 2002). State prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing are
not limited to Brady as the basis for a due process violation. For a more complete
discussion of possible constitutional violations to use as the basis for a § 1983 claim
seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing, see Vetter, supra n.27, at 590-93.
32
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
33
Id. at 87.
34
Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas wrote, “[s]ociety wins not only
when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Id.
35
Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d at 317 (Luttig, J. concurring); see also Vetter,
supra n.27, at 591-92. Vetter notes that while this extends the meaning of Brady
beyond its plain language, “the extension is not entirely unreasonable and has been
accepted by at least one district court.” Vetter, supra n.27, at 591-92.
36
Schwartz, supra n.29, at 89.
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Klu Klux Klan violence by applying their own laws required a federal
work-around.37 Where both Congress and subsequent Supreme Court
opinions expressed such a clear distrust of state action in the matter,
implementing a “state exhaustion” requirement would have voided the
purpose of the statute.38
C. Why the decision between habeas corpus and § 1983 matters
The growth of constitutional rights extended to state prisoners in
the middle of the 20th century, paired with a dearth of post-conviction
rights actually offered by the states, generated a system in which
federal courts seemed to supervise state procedures.39 In order to
protect their decisions, states responded by expanding their own postconviction procedures.40 This growth of state procedure, when paired
with the federal habeas statute’s exhaustion requirement, created
added delay to the adjudication of prisoners’ constitutional rights.41 In
addition, prisoners subject to these state post-conviction procedures
may not receive the full protections ordinarily accorded under due
process,42 raising the question of whether these added procedures
serve the interests of justice.
Section 1983 claims present plaintiffs with a number of
advantages over federal habeas applications. First, because § 1983
claims are not subject to the added delay of the state exhaustion
requirement, state prisoners may seek immediate relief in federal
court.43 Additionally, because § 1983 is a civil action, prisoners may
seek monetary damages in addition to any injunctive or declaratory
37

Id.
Id. at 90.
39
Steiker, supra n.11, at 342 (1998).
40
Id. at 342-43.
41
Id. at 343.
42
Id. For instance, Professor Striker notes that prisoners are not entitled to the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state post-conviction hearings. Id. at 343-44,
n.114; see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
43
Vetter, supra n.27, at 595.
38
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relief.44 On the other hand, the lack of a state exhaustion requirement
means that state courts may find their decisions overturned in federal
court as the result of § 1983 actions, increasing friction between the
state and federal judicial systems.45 Nevertheless, the significant
advantages in bringing a § 1983 action rather than seeking federal
habeas relief led state prisoners to begin using § 1983 as an alternative
to habeas corpus when attempting to have their constitutional claims
heard.46 The significant overlap of the two approaches eventually
required judicial intervention.
II. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the conflict
between prisoners using § 1983 and writs of habeas corpus in the 1973
case Preiser v. Rodriguez.47 The Court later clarified its position in
1994 with Heck v. Humphrey.48 Though neither case specifically
addressed how § 1983 and habeas claims pertained to requests for
post-conviction access to DNA testing, they created the larger
framework by which later analysis would be conducted. Subsequent to
Heck, a split developed between several Federal Circuit courts over
whether such post-conviction DNA testing requests could be made
using § 1983, or instead limited to habeas relief. As the Circuits
debated, the Supreme Court issued Wilkinson v. Dotson, which further
clarified Heck without speaking definitively on the issue of postconviction access to DNA testing. This section will examine the
development of these precedents, from the stage set by the Supreme
Court in Preiser and Heck—and later Dotson—to the decisions
creating the split amongst the Federal appellate courts.
44

Id. at 595.
See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950) (writing that federal courts’
power to review state court decisions through habeas actions created “an area of
potential conflict between state and federal courts”).
46
Vetter, supra n.27, at 595.
47
411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973).
48
512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994).
45
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A. Supreme Court Precedent
1. Preiser v. Rodriguez
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court heard
arguments from three New York state prisoners challenging the
validity of their imprisonment.49 Decided in 1974, Preiser was issued
almost thirty years before Harvey v. Horan, the first case where
federal appellate courts grappled with the viability of post-conviction
DNA testing requests through § 1983.50 In examining the more general
question of whether a prisoner could challenge his confinement
through a § 1983 claim,51 however, Preiser laid the groundwork for
the later DNA cases.
Preiser consolidated a number of lawsuits that shared a common
thread: each prisoner had earned a number of “good-time” credits
which should have had the effect of shortening their sentence had the
credits not been revoked by the state prison.52 The prisoners filed
lawsuits under § 1983 claiming that their credits had been
unconstitutionally revoked under color of state law.53 Because each
prisoner had secured enough “good-time” credits to be released
immediately but for the revocation, a successful challenge of the
procedures by which they were deprived of those credits would have
resulted in an immediate release from prison.54
New York contended that the prisoners’ claims should be limited
to habeas corpus relief and were not properly brought via § 1983.55
Because the prisoners were poised to be released from prison if their
claims succeeded, New York argued that the prisoners were actually

49

411 U.S. at 476-77.
Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002).
51
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 477.
52
Id. at 476-82.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 487.
55
See id. at 482.
50
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challenging the very validity of their imprisonment.56 Such an action
traditionally could only be accomplished through a writ of habeas
corpus, which required exhaustion of state remedies.57 In an en banc
hearing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the State,
holding that the § 1983 claims were valid, and “not subject to any
requirement of exhaustion of state remedies.”58
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a 6-3 decision,
holding that the state prisoners were limited to habeas relief.59 In
justifying its holding, the Court noted that issues of federal-state
comity were of primary concern.60 While the dissent argued that
previous Court decisions had allowed § 1983 actions on questions of
state prison administration without disturbing notions of federal-state
comity, the majority replied that the issues in those cases did not
implicate any other statute, while the case before them directly
addressed the purpose of the federal habeas corpus statute: challenging
the validity of the prisoners’ confinement.61 Thus, the court held that
“when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that
he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”62
The Preiser Court noted in dicutm that its holding did not prevent
a prisoner from bringing a suit under § 1983 seeking montetary
damages.63 While the plaintiffs’ requests in Preiser for equitable relief
would have resulted in restoration of their good-time credits, and
therefore resulted in their immediate release, the Court wrote that an
award of damages would yield no direct effect on the “fact or length”
56

See id.
See id.
58
Id. The Second Circuit’s decision was highly contested within the en banc
panel, generating opinions by eight judges, including three dissents. Id.
59
Id. at 500.
60
Id. at 591.
61
Id. at 592 n.10.
62
See id. at 500.
63
Id. at 494.
57
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of a prisoner’s imprisonment.64 Despite the Court’s plain language
authorizing prisoners to use § 1983 to seek monetary damages in
Preiser,65 the Court would be forced to readdress the issue 21 years
later in Heck v. Humphrey.
2. Heck v. Humphrey
In Heck v. Humphrey, an Indiana state prisoner convicted of
voluntary manslaughter filed a § 1983 claim against several state
officials, alleging, amongst other things, that his prosecution had been
unlawful and the defendants had destroyed exculpatory evidence.66
However, rather than seeking his release through injunctive relief, the
plaintiff sought money damages.67 Heck sheds light on the split over
post-conviction DNA testing because rather than seeking actual release
from prison—which would have been the ultimate result had the
Preiser plaintiffs succeeded in their § 1983 claims— both the Heck
and DNA plaintiffs sought some other form of relief. Both the District
Court and the Seventh Circuit agreed that although the Heck plaintiff’s
claim did not seek his release from prison, a victory on the merits
would call into question the very validity of his confinement.68
Because Preiser’s dictum concerning monetary damages appeared to
64
65

Id.
The Presier Court wrote:
If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something
other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking
something other than immediate or more speedy release—the more
traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages
claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal
remedy. Accordingly, . . . a damages action by a state prisoner
could be brought under the Civil Rights Act in federal court
without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies.

Id.
66

512 U.S. 477, 478-79 (1994).
Id. at 479.
68
Id. at 479-80.
67

570
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/5

14

Newton: Sweet Result in Savory: How the Seventh Circuit Took the Correct

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

carve out an opening for a valid § 1983 claim, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the prisoner’s claim could
rightly be heard.69
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
holding that a § 1983 claim for money damages cannot stand if the
plaintiff’s victory on the merits would call into question the validity or
duration of his imprisonment.70 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
began by highlighting Preiser’s dictum, which stated that a prisoner’s
§ 1983 claim for money damages would not trigger the state
exhaustion requirement because it wouldn’t attack the validity or
duration of a prisoner’s confinement.71 However, he noted “[t]hat
statement might not be true . . . when establishing the basis for the
damages claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the
conviction.”72 For instance, Justice Scalia explained that a case in
which a prisoner brought a § 1983 claim for money damages alleging
that a prison had used the wrong administrative procedures did not
violate Preiser because the prisoner was not challenging the essence of
his confinement, but rather a set of procedures that were used.73 On the
other hand, if the Heck plaintiff were to win his § 1983 claim on the
merits, a court would have to find that the defendants actually did
conduct an unlawful investigation and destroyed exculpatory evidence.
Such a finding would clearly call into question the validity of the
plaintiff’s confinement, an outcome prohibited by Preiser if it results
from a § 1983 claim.
The Court rationalized its holding by drawing an analogy between
the Heck plaintiff’s suit and the common law tort of malicious

69

Id. at 480.
Id. at 487.
71
Id. at 481.
72
Id. at 481-82.
73
Id. at 482-83. Here the Court was referring to the facts of Wolff v.
McDonnell, a case in which the Court held that the prisoner’s § 1983 claim for
damages was valid. See 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
70
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prosecution.74 One key element a plaintiff must establish in a
malicious prosecution action is that the underlying criminal
proceeding was resolved in his favor.75 The rationale behind this
requirement is that it helps provide finality in criminal judgments, and
prevents prisoners from making collateral attacks on their
convictions.76 The Court therefore reasoned that if such collateral
attacks were prevented in the common law, then the same requirement
should be applied to the tort liability created by § 1983.77
Seeking to clarify any misconceptions caused by Preiser’s dictum,
the Court held that in order for a prisoner’s § 1983 claim for money
damages to survive, “a district court must consider whether a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”78 Justice Scalia went on to
note that “if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action,
even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should
be allowed to proceed.”79
B. The Circuit Split: Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing
After Preiser and Heck, lower courts began to struggle with the
issue of whether a prisoner’s post-conviction request for access to
physical evidence for DNA testing could properly be brought under
§ 1983, or was instead restricted to habeas relief. The Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Circuits held that such requests should be limited to habeas
relief. While the leading cases in those jurisdictions were heard prior
to Dotson, subsequent decisions in those circuits have persisted in
74

Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. The Court also reasoned that because § 1983 created
a kind of tort liability, and tort liability was derived from the common law, then the
common law should be consulted for guidance. Id. at 483.
75
Id. at 484.
76
Id. at 484-85.
77
Id. at 486.
78
Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
79
Id. (emphasis in original).
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holding that such requests are limited to habeas relief. On the other
hand, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits held that requests for postconviction DNA testing could rightly be made through a § 1983 claim.
This section will examine the critical cases for each approach.
1. Habeas Corpus Relief Only—the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits
In the January 2002 decision Harvey v. Horan, the Fourth Circuit
was the first federal appellate court to hold that a prisoner seeking
post-conviction access to physical evidence for DNA testing was
limited to habeas relief.80 The plaintiff in Harvey, a Virginia state
prisoner who had been convicted of rape and forcible sodomy, filed a
§ 1983 claim seeking access to the rape kit in order to conduct DNA
testing that had been unavailable at the time of his conviction.81 The
district court found that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was cognizable
because it did not challenge the length or duration of his conviction.82
The State appealed.83
In a 2–1 decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court and
held that a plaintiff seeking post-conviction access to DNA evidence
was limited to habeas corpus relief. Writing for the majority, Chief
Judge Wilkinson first looked to Heck’s holding that a plaintiff may not
use § 1983 if a successful claim would “necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”84 Despite the plaintiff’s
argument that DNA evidence may just as well prove his guilt, the
court responded that the plaintiff’s action was only the first step in a
broader attempt at challenging his conviction.85 As such, the court
found that the request was merely an attempt at an end run around
Heck, and held that the § 1983 claim was not viable.86
80

278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 373-74.
82
Id. at 374.
83
Id.
84
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
85
Harvey, 278 F.3d at 375.
86
Id.
81
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The court proceeded to list a number of policy justifications for
limiting a plaintiff to habeas relief, the foremost of which was the
necessity of finality in criminal judgments.87 The court worried that if
prisoners were able to request new testing of physical evidence every
time a new form of technology were developed, then the finality of
criminal judgments would persistently be brought into question.88 The
court went on to say that “[t]he possibility of post-conviction
developments, whether in law or science, is simply too great to justify
judicially sanctioned constitutional attacks upon final criminal
judgments.”89
The court also expressed concern that allowing post-conviction
access to DNA testing of physical evidence through § 1983 claims
would constitute judicial encroachment on an issue more properly
settled by the democratic process.90 Noting that several state
legislatures had taken action in increasing post-conviction access to
DNA evidence, the court feared that allowing access via § 1983 would
stunt those initiatives.91 The court therefore held that the plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim could not stand, and limited him to habeas relief.92
Shortly after the Harvey decision, several other circuits followed
the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning. In August of 2002, the Fifth Circuit
held that a prisoner seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing was
limited to habeas relief, and specifically cited Harvey as persuasive in
its reasoning.93 One month later, the Sixth Circuit followed similar
reasoning in an unpublished opinion.94 As recently as June of 2007, a
court in the Northern District of Texas cited Harvey and its progeny as

87

Id.
Id. at 376.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 377.
92
Id.
93
Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2002).
94
See Boyle v. Mayer, 46 Fed.Appx. 340 (6th Cir. 2002).
88
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support for denying a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim requesting postconviction access to DNA testing.95
2. § 1983 Claims Cognizable—the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
Though decisions issued by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits during
the first 8 months of 2002 suggested a trending building toward
denying prisoners post-conviction access to DNA testing via a § 1983
claim, the Eleventh Circuit arrived at a contrary position in Bradley v.
Pryor, decided in September of 2002.96 The plaintiff in Bradley had
been convicted in Alabama for the murder of his stepdaughter in
1983.97 In 2001, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action seeking access to
the rape kit and the victim’s clothing in order to conduct DNA
testing.98 A magistrate judge suggested dismissing the plaintiff’s claim,
stating that it was no different than a habeas application and was
subject to the habeas requirements.99 The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s findings and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.100 The
plaintiff appealed and the Eleventh Circuit granted review on the issue
of “[w]hether a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action initiated by a state prisoner
. . . which seeks to compel the state to produce physical evidence for
DNA testing . . . for the purpose of later asserting a claim of actual
95

Gilkey v. Livingston, 2007 WL 1953456 at 5 (N.D. Tex. June 27, 2007),
appeal dismissed on procedural grounds 2008 WL 1766876 (5th Cir. Apr 15, 2008)
(looking to Harvey and Kutzner in holding that a prisoner seeking post-conviction
access to biological evidence for DNA testing was restricted to habeas relief). The
District Court’s opinion adopted the findings and conclusions of Magistrate Judge
Paul D. Stickney. Id. at *1. In his opinion, Judge Stickney noted the circuit split, but
stated that stare decisis bound the court to follow the Fifth Circuit’s holding in
Kutzner. Id. at *6, n.3.
96
305 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2002).
97
Id. at 1288.
98
Id. at 1289. The State contended that it no longer had the evidence the
plaintiff sought, but the plaintiff pushed for discovery in order to test the State’s
assertion. Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
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innocence . . . is the ‘functional equivalent’ of a petition for federal
habeas corpus.”101
Just as the Fourth Circuit did in Harvey, the Bradley court began
its analysis by looking to Preiser and Heck. The court focused on
Heck’s language regarding “‘whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence.’”102 However, unlike the Harvey court, the Eleventh Circuit
was persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that success in his claim
would not challenge the validity of his imprisonment, but instead
would merely provide him access to DNA evidence.103 Writing for the
court, Judge Barkett explained:
[the plaintiff] prevails in this lawsuit once he has access
to [the DNA] evidence . . . . Nothing in that result
necessarily demonstrates or even implies that his
conviction is invalid. As [the plaintiff] points out, it is
possible that the evidence will not exculpate
him . . . . But even if the evidence, after testing, permits
[the plaintiff] to challenge his sentence, that challenge
is no part of his § 1983 suit. He would have to initiate
an entirely different lawsuit, alleging an entirely
different constitutional violation, in order to
demonstrate that his conviction and sentence are
invalid.104
The court went on to dismiss the Harvey court’s reasoning that a
§ 1983 claim for post-conviction access to DNA testing was the
“functional equivalent of a habeas corpus proceeding” merely because
it was setting the stage for a subsequent challenge.105 Judge Barkett
101

Id.
Id. at 1290 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994))
(emphasis added).
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
102
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contended that “[a]lthough [the plaintiff] might use the evidence, at
some future date, to initiate a separate action challenging his
conviction, future exculpation is not a necessary implication of [the
plaintiff’s] claim in this case.”106 As such, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court, and held that the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
seeking post-conviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of
DNA testing did not violate the language set forth in Heck, and
remanded for further proceedings.107
C. Wilkinson v. Dotson and After
As the Circuits developed differing approaches for applying Heck
to the issue of § 1983 claims for post-conviction access to DNA
testing, the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson took a
step toward clarifying the issue.108 While Heck eliminated the
confusion revolving around prisoners’ § 1983 claims for money
damages created by Preiser, the Court in Dotson sought to make a
broader statement on the validity of prisoner’s § 1983 claims.109 In
Dotson, two Ohio inmates brought § 1983 claims challenging the
constitutionality of state parole procedures.110 In each case, the prison
parole board applied procedures enacted after each inmate had begun
to serve his sentence.111 The inmates sued under § 1983 in federal
district court, alleging that the prison officials had violated Due
Process and the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, and sought
declaratory and injunctive relief.112 While the district court found that
the prisoners were restricted to habeas relief and dismissed the
complaints, the Sixth Circuit found that the § 1983 claims were valid

106

Id.
Id. at 1291, 92.
108
544 U.S. 74, 76 (2005).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 77.
112
Id.
107
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and reversed the lower court.113 The Ohio state officials filed a petition
for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted review.114
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Ohio state
prisoners’ § 1983 claims were valid and remanded the case for further
proceedings. In his majority opinion, Justice Breyer first addressed
Ohio’s contention that because the prisoners believed that the success
of their § 1983 claims would ultimately lead to a speedier release from
prison, they were actually challenging the duration of their
confinement—essentially an assertion that the prisoners’ § 1983 claim
violated the holding in Preiser.115 Considering the Court’s
jurisprudence on the issue, the Court held “that the connection
between the constitutionality of the prisoners’ parole proceedings and
release from confinement is too tenuous here to achieve Ohio’s legal
door-closing objective.”116
The Court next examined the progression of the issue, including
Preiser and Heck.117 In order to provide a final and clear statement of
the law on the issue, Justice Breyer wrote:
These cases, taken together, indicate that a state
prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior
invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s
suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal
prison proceedings)—if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement
or its duration.118

113

Id.
Id.
115
Id. at 78.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 78-81.
118
Id. at 81-82 (emphasis in original).
114
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Crucially, the Court found that the prisoners were neither requesting
speedier release nor challenging the validity of their confinement.119 In
explaining the potential result of one of the prisoner’s claims, the
Court wrote that “[s]uccess . . . does not mean immediate release from
confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it means at most new
eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of a new
parole application.”120 Thus, the Dotson court’s analysis hinged on the
word “necessarily.” Only if the prisoner’s § 1983 claim “necessarily”
implied the invalidity of his confinement would he be forced to seek
habeas relief.121
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in Dotson stating that
Ohio’s suggestion that the plaintiff be limited to habeas relief would
require the Court “to broaden the scope of habeas relief beyond
recognition.”122 Pointing to the writ’s common law purpose of
securing immediate release from unlawful confinement, Scalia argued
that the writ should not be expanded to involve forms of relief too far
removed from that common law foundation.123 Because the Dotson
plaintiff’s request for relief—a new parole proceeding—did not fall
within the realm of the writ’s common law purpose, Justice Scalia
contended that limiting him to habeas relief would be inappropriate.124
Thus, where the plaintiff’s requested relief did not bear on the status of
his confinement, Justice Scalia agreed that a § 1983 claim was
viable.125

119

Id. at 82.
Id.
121
Id. at 81-82. Heck actually used the word “necessarily” in its holding, but
did nothing to draw attention to its importance. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994) (holding that habeas must be used if “judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence”). The Dotson
court, however, highlighted the word’s importance by using it eight times in two
pages. See Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81-82.
122
Dotson, 544 U.S. at 85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 86.
125
Id. at 85-86.
120
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Shortly after Dotson, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Osborne v.
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District readdressed
the issue of prisoner’s § 1983 claims for post-conviction access to
DNA testing.126 The Osborne opinion suggested that Dotson provided
the final word on the viability of § 1983 claims seeking postconviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of DNA
testing.127 Noting how the Dotson court “emphasized that to be barred
under Heck, a § 1983 claim must, if successful, necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration,” the
Osborne court reasoned that the Harvey argument that claims setting
the stage for subsequent attack on confinement were prohibited was
“undercut considerably.”128
Despite Osborne’s close reading of Dotson, the language of
Dotson does not expressly overrule the holdings of Harvey and
Kutzner. Moreover, as noted earlier, at least one post-Dotson federal
court has persisted in holding that prisoner’s claims for postconviction access to DNA testing must be confined to habeas corpus
proceedings.129 Thus, the Seventh Circuit was forced to come to its
own decision on the issue in the 2006 case Savory v. Lyons.
III. SAVORY V. LYONS
A. The Facts of Savory
In June of 1977, Johnnie Lee Savory II was convicted for the
murder of James Robinson and Connie Cooper, who were found dead

126

423 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005). Dotson was filed on March 7, 2005, while
Osborne was filed on September 8, 2005.
127
The Osborne court wrote that “[a]ny remaining doubt as to the propriety of
[seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing through a § 1983 claim] is removed,
we believe, by the Court’s recent opinion in Dotson.” Id. at 1055.
128
Id. (emphasis in original).
129
See Gilkey v. Livingston, 2007 WL 1953456 at 5 (N.D. Tex. June 27,
2007), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds 2008 WL 1766876 (5th Cir. Apr 15,
2008).
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in their Peoria, Illinois home in January of the same year.130 Although
his first conviction was reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court due to
an involuntary confession, he “was retried and convicted” in 1981.131
At his retrial, three of Savory’s friends stated that he had made
incriminating statements to them.132 The state presented several pieces
of physical evidence at the trial, including 1) strands of hair
resembling Savory’s collected at the scene of the crime; 2) a knife
spotted with trace amounts of blood found at Savory’s home; and 3) a
pair of bloodstained pants Savory may have worn which matched the
blood type of the victim.133
Subsequent to his conviction, Savory made several attempts to
challenge his conviction and confinement, including direct appeals,134
habeas corpus proceedings in federal court, 135 post-conviction
proceedings in state court,136 and a petition for a writ of mandamus.137
In 1998, Savory filed a motion in Illinois state court138 pursuant to an
Illinois state statute which, under certain circumstances, allows a
defendant to conduct DNA testing on physical evidence presented at
his trial if the method of testing was not available at the time of his
trial.139 When Savory’s motion was denied, he appealed to the

130

Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
People v. Savory, 435 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People v. Savory,
403 N.E.2d 118 (Ill App. Ct. 1980);.
135
United States ex rel. Savory v. Peters, 1995 WL 9242 (N.D.Ill. January 9,
1995); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 1985 WL 2108 (N.D.Ill. July 25, 1985),
aff’d, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987).
136
People v. Savory, 638 N.E.2d 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
137
See Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2006).
138
Id. at 669.
139
725 ILCS 5/116-3 (2008). “[T]he result of the testing [must have] the
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to
the defendant’s assertion of actual innocence.” 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c)(1) (2008).
131
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appellate court and the Supreme Court, both of which upheld the lower
court’s order.140
Nearly seven years after the Illinois circuit court denied Savory’s
motion for access to the physical evidence, Savory filed a suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of state and local officials (the
“State”), arguing that their denial violated his constitutional rights.141
He asked the district court to compel the State to give him access to 1)
the bloodstained pants; 2) the hair samples; 3) the blood-spotted knife;
and 4) DNA samples provided by Savory, his father, and others.142 The
district court dismissed the claim on the State’s 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, finding that the two year statute of limitations had run, and
Savory no longer had a viable claim before the court.143 Savory then
appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis
Before addressing the merits of Savory’s claim, the Seventh
Circuit first examined whether Savory could rightly bring an action to
compel post-conviction access to physical evidence under § 1983.144
The State argued along the lines of Harvey, asserting that Savory was
a state prisoner attempting to challenge the “fact or duration” of his
confinement, and his options were therefore limited to habeas
corpus.145 Judge Kanne, who authored the opinion, noted that Supreme
Court precedents established by Preiser and Heck prevented a claim

140

The Illinois Supreme Court held that because the success of the State’s case
relied on other evidence, the bloodstained pants were not “materially relevant” to
Savory’s innocence, and upheld the circuit court’s denial of his motion to compel
DNA testing. People v. Savory, 756 N.E.2d 804, 811-12 (Ill. 2001).
141
Savory, 469 F.3d at 669. The officials included the State’s Attorney of
Peoria County, Illinois, the Clerk of the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court of Illinois, the
Chief of Police of the City of Peoria, and Peoria County, Illinois. Id.
142
Id. at 670.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
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from being brought under § 1983 if it “would necessarily imply the
validity of [the plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence.”146
The court first analyzed the Supreme Court’s approaches to
similar issues, noting that the high court’s opinion in Wilkinson v.
Dotson had focused on Heck’s use of the use of the word
“necessarily.”147 The court then turned its attention to how the specific
question of post-conviction access to physical evidence had created a
split amongst its sister circuits.148 Judge Kanne highlighted the
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Bradley that not only could updated
DNA testing further incriminate the plaintiff, but even if it did suggest
the plaintiff’s innocence, he would need to bring an entirely separate
action to actually challenge his confinement.149 The court also
discussed the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning that because § 1983 would set
up a challenge to the prisoner’s confinement, it was merely an attempt
to circumvent the habeas corpus requirement.150
Ultimately the court found the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in
Bradley to be more in line with the Supreme Court’s precedents set in
Preiser and Heck.151 Judge Kanne emphasized that the exception
requiring the use of habeas corpus over § 1983 is narrow, and that
courts must consider the immediate results of the success of the
plaintiff’s motion. The court wrote:
Savory will not be released from prison, nor will his
sentence be shortened, if he successfully gains access to
physical evidence for DNA testing. Such access would
not imply the invalidity of his conviction. At most, he
would have the opportunity to use the results of the
DNA testing in a future proceeding. Thus, success in
Savory’s action “will not demonstrate the invalidity of
146

Id. at 669 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)).
Id. at 671.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 672.
147
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any outstanding criminal judgment against [him],” and
will not unduly intrude upon the core habeas corpus
relief.152
The court therefore held that Savory had brought a cognizable claim
under § 1983.153
IV. ANALYSIS: EVALUATION OF SAVORY IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
AND DOTSON
In Savory, the Seventh Circuit was forced to choose between two
conflicting approaches: the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit’s position
that prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing are
limited to habeas relief, and the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit’s position
that prisoners may also seek such relief through a § 1983 claim. In
disapproving of the Harvey approach, the Seventh Circuit not only
drew support from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit’s decisions on the
matter, but also from the recent Supreme Court Wilkinson v. Dotson
opinion. In order understand why the Seventh Circuit reached the
proper result in Savory, it is necessary to explain a) how the Harvey
court applied Heck; b) how Dotson’s clarification of Heck drew
Harvey into question; and c) why the Dotson framework applied to the
facts of Savory resolves the argument in favor of the viability of
§ 1983 claims seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing.
A. Harvey’s “Packaging” in Applying Heck
The source of the circuit split over post-conviction access to DNA
testing lay in the Harvey court’s application of Heck and its failure to
draw a critical distinction between two separate legal actions. The
152

Id. (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)) (emphasis in
original).
153
Id. Despite the holding regarding the general viability of § 1983 claims
seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing, the court ultimately affirmed the
district court’s finding that Savory’s individual § 1983 claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. Id. at 675.
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Harvey court reasoned that the plaintiff’s § 1983 action could not
proceed because it was merely a predicate to a subsequent motion
seeking his release from prison.154 By this logic, the prisoner’s claim
violated Heck’s mandate that prisoners seeking post-conviction relief
be limited to habeas if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”155
In applying Heck, the Harvey court created a single “package” out
of two separate and distinct legal actions. The first action—which was
the subject of the decision—was the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim seeking
post-conviction access to DNA testing (“Action One”). The second
action, which could only commence if the first action proved
successful, was a motion seeking release from prison (“Action Two”).
In order to reach its decision that Action One violated Heck, the
Harvey court merged Action One and Action Two into one
indistinguishable package. While Heck never suggested that this sort
of packaging was necessary, neither was it forbidden. Thus, Harvey’s
“packaging” approach was not drawn into serious question until
Dotson revisited Heck.
B. How Dotson Unpackaged Harvey
In Dotson, the Supreme Court examined the conflict of § 1983
and habeas as it pertained to prisoners seeking review of parole
procedures.156 The fundamental issue before the Dotson court was no
different from Heck: the cognizability of a § 1983 claim for a prisoner
seeking post-conviction relief.157 However, the factual situation
presented in Dotson was slightly different than Heck because success
in Dotson would not have necessarily invalidated the prisoner’s
conviction. Success did “not mean immediate release from
confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it [meant] at most new
eligibility review, which at most [would] speed consideration of a new
154

Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2002).
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
156
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 76 (2005).
157
See id.; Heck, 512 U.S. at 478.
155
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parole application.”158 In comparison, the Heck plaintiff could not win
his § 1983 suit for damages without necessarily implying his
conviction’s invalidity due to destruction of evidence and unlawful
prosecution.159
This distinction, highlighted by the Court’s repeated use of the
word “necessarily,”160 was the fundamental clarification that Dotson
provided. Dotson implicitly drew Harvey’s “packaging” approach into
serious question by barring only those § 1983 claims which would
necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement. Though
Dotson did not specifically address the viability of § 1983 claims for
post-conviction access to DNA evidence, its relevance to the issue was
quickly noticed by the Ninth Circuit.161 This set the stage for the
Seventh Circuit’s treatment of the issue in Savory.
C. How Savory Got It Right by Applying Dotson
When the Seventh Circuit analyzed the relevant precedent in
Savory, it highlighted Dotson’s holding that § 1983 claims for post
conviction relief should be barred only if they “‘necessarily’
implicated the fact or duration of confinement.”162 By using Dotson to
create the judicial framework for resolving the circuit split, the Savory
court implicitly drew the Fourth Circuit’s approach into question.
Once the court recognized Dotson’s relevance to the issue of post158

Dotson, 544 U.S. at 76.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 490.
160
See Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81 (writing that “§ 1983 remains available for
procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell
immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” (emphasis in original)); see also id.
at 81-82 (holding “that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred… if success in that
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.
(emphasis in original)); and id. at 82 (writing that “because neither prisoner’s claim
would necessarily spell speedier release, neither lies at ’the core of habeas corpus.’
(quoting Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973))).
161
Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District, 423 F.3d
1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2005).
162
Id. at 671.
159
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conviction requests for DNA testing, a decision validating the use of
§ 1983 claims became inevitable.
The Savory court first noted that § 1983 claims for postconviction access to DNA testing may prove either exculpatory or
inculpatory.163 If the DNA test showed that the prisoner indeed
committed the crime, then the result of the § 1983 action would not
have called the prisoner’s confinement into question. As such, so long
as a chance exists that DNA testing could prove inculpatory, then a
§ 1983 claim merely seeking access to the testing cannot necessarily
call into question the validity of a prisoner’s confinement.
The Seventh Circuit then incorporated the Dotson argument,
stating that even if the DNA testing proved exculpatory, the plaintiff
would still have to bring another legal action to pursue actual release
from prison.164 Judge Kanne wrote that “to overturn his conviction
[the plaintiff would have to bring] ‘an entirely separate action at some
future date, in which he would have to argue for his release upon the
basis of a separate constitutional violation altogether.’”165
Procedurally, this is synonymous with the Supreme Court’s rationale
in Dotson that the plaintiff’s success in the § 1983 action would only
mean a new review by the prison parole board, where an entirely
separate action—the actual review itself—would be necessary to
secure release from prison.166 By applying Dotson in this way, Savory
“unpackaged” Action One (the § 1983 action seeking access to DNA
testing) from Action Two (the subsequent action seeking release from
prison). It is this second action—in which a plaintiff would argue that
he was being imprisoned despite the existence of exculpatory DNA
evidence proving his innocence—that should be limited to habeas
relief, as it is the only action which truly challenges the validity of the
plaintiff’s confinement. As the Savory court correctly pointed out,

163

See id.
Id.
165
Id.(quoting Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 308 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
166
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005).
164
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access alone cannot imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s
confinement.167
Judge Kanne also made sure to address the comity issue that
played a central role in the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Harvey.168
Because a plaintiff’s success “[would] not demonstrate the invalidity
of any outstanding criminal judgment against [him],” his § 1983 claim
would not unduly intrude upon territory traditionally reserved for
habeas actions.169
Finally, while not mentioned in Savory, it bears noting that Justice
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Dotson provides further support for the
Seventh Circuit’s result. Justice Scalia asserted that the common law
roots of the writ of habeas corpus should act as a limit on the relief the
writ can actually provide.170 If the sought-after relief bears no
resemblance to actual release from prison (or at least the shortening of
a sentence), then use of the writ would “broaden the scope of habeas
relief beyond recognition.”171 In the case of Savory, gaining access to
physical evidence in order to perform DNA testing would not fall
within the limited scope of habeas relief. As such, it would be
inappropriate for Savory to seek access to testing through a writ of
habeas corpus.
The Seventh Circuit’s recognition of Dotson’s relevance provided
the key to reaching the correct result in Savory. Dotson provided a
method to undo the “packaging” approach created in Harvey, which
erroneously limited prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA
testing to habeas relief. In allowing prisoners to seek such relief
through § 1983 claims, the Savory court reached the proper result and
preserved habeas relief to its traditional purpose.

167

Savory, 469 F.3d at 672.
See Harvey, 285 F.3d at 303.
169
Savory, 469 F.3d at 672.
170
Dotson, 544 U.S. at 85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
171
Id. at 85.
168

588
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/5

32

Newton: Sweet Result in Savory: How the Seventh Circuit Took the Correct

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

CONCLUSION
Not all courts agree with Savory’s application of Dotson to the
issue of § 1983 claims for post-conviction access to DNA testing. In
June 2007, over two years after Dotson and nearly one year after
Savory, a district court in the Northern District of Texas held that a
plaintiff seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing was limited to
habeas relief in Gilkey v. Livingston.172 While mentioning the differing
results reached in Osborne and Bradley, the court stated that it was
“bound by Fifth Circuit case law.”173 Such a result is at odds with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Dotson. By holding that § 1983 claims for
post-conviction access to DNA testing are viable, the Savory court
reached the proper result and ensured that future cases in the Seventh
Circuit on the issue would be in line with Supreme Court precedent.
By arriving at the correct result, the Savory court did more than
simply secure another procedural route for prisoners seeking postconviction access to physical evidence for the purpose of DNA testing.
Section 1983 claims, which proceed directly to federal court,
circumvent the state-exhaustion requirement imposed by the federal
habeas statute that can create significant time delays.174 Additionally,
while prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA testing through
a writ of habeas corpus may not seek monetary damages, a prisoner
seeking the same relief through a § 1983 claim can seek monetary
damages.175 Thus, the advantages gained by allowing prisoners to
pursue their claims through § 1983 are not merely procedural in
nature. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Savory therefore provides
both timely resolution and a full range of remedies to prisoners

172

Gilkey v. Livingston, 2007 WL 1953456, at *5 (N.D.Tex. June 27, 2007),
appeal dismissed on procedural grounds 2008 WL 1766876 (5th Cir. Apr 15, 2008).
173
Id. at *6 n.3.
174
For a description of the complicated process involved in seeking habeas
relief, see Steiker, supra n.11, at 315-16 (writing that “[f]our, five or even six federal
and state courts might address the merits of a federal claim before the defendant’s
legal remedies are exhausted”).
175
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see also Schwartz, supra n.29, at 89.
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attempting to address wrongs suffered at the hands of government
actors.
As demonstrated by the success of CSI and its imitators, the
promise of justice provided by DNA testing has captured the public
imagination. While the benefits of this technology are obvious, there
should be concern when those that may possibly benefit most from its
use—prisoners who may be exonerated by an exculpatory DNA test—
are excluded from timely access due to procedural roadblocks. The
decision in Savory ensures that these promises of justice do not remain
a fiction confined to a prisoner’s common room TV screen.
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